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Abstract: In  the  contemporary  converged  media  environment,  agenda  setting  is  being 
transformed by the dramatic growth of  audiences that are simultaneously media users and 
producers. The study reported here addresses related gaps in the literature by first comparing 
the topical agendas of two leading traditional media outlets (New York Times and CNN) with 
the most frequently shared stories and trending topics on two widely popular Social Networking 
Sites (Facebook and Twitter). Time-series analyses of the most prominent topics identify the 
extent to which traditional media sets the agenda for social media as well as reciprocal agenda-
setting effects of social media topics entering traditional media agendas. In addition, this study 
examines social intermedia agenda setting topically and across time within social networking 
sites, and in so doing, adds a vital understanding of where traditional media, online uses, and 
social  media  content  intersect  around  instances  of  focusing  events,  particularly  elections. 
Findings identify core differences between certain traditional and social media agendas, but also 
within social media agendas that extend from uses examined here. Additional results further 
suggest important topical and event-oriented limitations upon the predictive capacity of social 
networking sites to shape traditional media agendas over time.
Keywords: election coverage; focusing events; Granger causality; intermedia agenda setting; 
social media
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1. Introduction
Since the seminal agenda-setting article of McCombs 
and Shaw [1], much has been made of the ability of 
media content to inform audiences what to think about 
rather than what to think. As originally introduced in 
that study, agenda setting conceptually identified that 
mass  media—specifically  local  and  national  newspa-
pers, national news magazines, and national television 
evening news broadcasts—directly  shaped the  public 
agenda  by  strategically  highlighting  specific  topics, 
issues, and actors in coverage over others. This process 
of increasing salience among media audiences, begun 
by McCombs and Shaw's initial inquiry of presidential 
campaign coverage, has now been explored across ex-
planatory dimensions such as need for orientation [2] 
as well as attributes in second-level agenda setting [3]. 
In addition, agenda setting evidence has been reported 
in  a  wide  range  of  national  contexts  across  diverse 
issues including elections, health, crime, war, and cul-
ture, among others [4].
Yet,  whether  dealing  with  election  campaigns  or 
other topics, mass media coverage shares a common 
feature: limited, and necessarily hierarchical, space to 
address  a  technologically  limited  array  of  issues. 
Agenda setting has therefore often been positioned as 
a technological byproduct of the gatekeeping activities 
of journalists and editors. On this point, Groshek [5] 
wrote, "because there is only so much space on the 
front  page of  a newspaper and only so much time 
devoted to the news on radio and television, agenda 
setting  is  unavoidable".  While  the  Internet  and  the 
transition of media production and audiences online 
has ameliorated the critical aspect of available space, 
the presentation order and style of reporting [6], as 
well  as  the  number  of  stories  that  are  covered  in 
online  channels  have been shown to  have  agenda-
setting effects  [7],  though measuring agendas  at  a 
broad topical level does introduce certain limitations. 
At the intersection of media technologies and agen-
das is  the well-documented shift  towards a dynamic 
user-producer media environment [8]. Indeed, the no-
tion  of  media  "produsers"  [9]  has  to  some  extent 
upended  the  norm  of  agenda  setting  running  from 
mass media to the public [10,11] in a manner that con-
ceptually resembles Entman's [12] cascading activation 
model.  Importantly,  however,  this  technologically  en-
gendered transformation has not only made it possible 
for audiences, but also editors and journalists to easily 
monitor the output of multiple media organizations, re-
gardless of time and location. By some accounts, such 
practices have actually  been linked to increasing the 
homogenization  of  both  media  and  public  agendas, 
rather than diversifying them [13-15].
Therefore,  topics  deemed  important  by  leading 
media channels, sometimes regardless of geographic-
al region, continue to identify similar—if not identical
—topics across media outlets and platforms. Numer-
ous scholars have noted the general lack of, or decline 
in,  diversity  of  news  content  over  recent  decades 
(see, for example, Gans [16]), and Schudson wrote, 
"the stories one reads in one publication are likely to 
bear a stronger resemblance to the stories in the next 
publication  than  they  would  have  in  the  past"  (as 
cited in Boczkowski and de Santos [14]).
Considering the somewhat paradoxical  confluence 
of these trends, this study examines the intermedia 
agenda-setting  influence  of  leading  mass  media  on 
leading Social Networking Sites (SNS) [17]. Specific-
ally,  coverage  from the  online  editions  of  the  New 
York  Times  and CNN are  separately  measured over 
time with the most frequently shared news items on 
Facebook and the highest-ranked trending topics on 
Twitter. In so doing, this study considers not only the 
concepts  of  media  homogenization  and  user-gen-
erated content but also the reciprocity of intermedia 
agenda setting across professional/de-professionalized 
boundaries.  Crucially,  this  study  thus  advances  the 
extant literature by modeling the time-ordered effect 
that social  media agendas,  such as those found on 
Facebook  and  Twitter  can  have  on  the  agendas  of 
leading traditional media in their online formats.
In relation to this goal, which builds upon previous 
findings  of  Meraz  [11]  and  Song  [6]  in  identifying 
Weblogs and other alternative online media as shap-
ing media and public agendas,  the literature review 
broadly situates  the  current  state  of  agenda-setting 
research  with  regard  to  social  networking  sites. 
Further, the review of literature examines the import 
of event-driven news and immediate reporting, spe-
cifically  involving  politics,  in  both  mass  and  social 
media to consider the empirical evidence of reciprocity 
in agenda trends.
2. Agenda Setting from Mass Media through 
Social Media
In a recent study, Meraz [11] reported that, over time, 
"agenda setting has matured as a theory to include a 
second-level  agenda-setting  component  (attribute 
agenda setting), a psychological component to explain 
individual-level  agenda-setting  effects  (need  for  ori-
entation), an emphasis on how the media's agenda is 
shaped,  and  an  explanation  for  the  shared  news 
agenda  among  different  media  (intermedia  agenda 
setting)". Still, while this theoretical approach of me-
dia  effects  research  has  been  analyzed  at  great 
lengths (with 567,000 topical hits on Google Scholar 
reported by Bennett and Iyengar [18] in 2008), found 
at different levels, and codified into unique typologies, 
agenda setting is being transformed by the dramatic 
growth of audiences that are simultaneously both me-
dia users and producers, notably on social networking 
sites.
Indeed, agenda setting is no longer conceived of as 
only a top-down process from (mainstream print and 
broadcast) media to audiences, but also as a dynamic 
process  where,  under  certain  conditions,  citizen  re-
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porting advanced in online spaces can give shape and 
definition  to  media  and  policy  agendas  among  the 
public [19,20]. Accordingly, as Sayre and colleagues 
reported, "the Internet is at the center of this change, 
expanding the definition of  news sources and news 
producers" [21]. Without question, the rise of the me-
dia "produser," as described by Bruns [9] has altered 
conceptions of where media agendas begin and end 
in relation to the public agenda. Considering the vast 
array of  options for  online media consumers to en-
gage, share, and create with varying levels of commit-
ment and intensity [22], it is clear that media agendas 
can  now regularly  intersect  and cross  amateur  and 
professional boundaries [11,21,23], which introduces 
a reinvigorated conception of intermedia agenda set-
ting that requires additional examination.
Historically, intermedia agenda setting has regularly 
been  studied  across  various  platforms,  media  sys-
tems, and geographical regions [4,24]. Yet, one of the 
most confounding results in the arena of intermedia 
agenda  setting  is  the  continual  increase  in  media 
outlets that is set in apparent contradiction with the 
growing cultural and thematic homogenization of the 
content  being  presented.  For  example,  Boczkowski 
and de Santos examined homogenization across Ar-
gentina's print and online newspapers and found the 
"intensification of online updates during the day coin-
cides with an increase in the level of content overlap 
in  the  print  and online  newspapers"  [14].  Similarly, 
Groshek examined the agendas of CNN and CNN In-
ternational  coverage  online  and  found  that  though 
"there  were  differences  in  which  issues  were  most 
salient on CNN and CNNI, the top three categories 
were the same for both: Crime, Politics, and War" [5]. 
Though previous research on professional intermedia 
agenda setting has generally  found some important 
topical cleavages, evidence suggests that the overall 
and thematic differences are more subtle and becom-
ing  less  distinct  in  what  has  become  global  media 
culture [25-27].
Beyond this dimension of  intermedia agenda set-
ting  within  and  across  professional  media,  scholars 
have begun to examine the spill-over [24] of online, 
user-generated content intersecting with the agendas 
of professional, traditionally offline media. In one ex-
ample that employed time-series analysis [11], it was 
found that Weblogs contributed to setting the agendas 
of traditional elite media. Along these conceptual and 
methodological  lines,  Sayre  et  al.  [21]  analyzed  and 
traced the relationships of thousands of YouTube videos 
and professional news media coverage of Proposition 8 
(a ballot measure regarding same-sex marriage) in Cali-
fornia. There, they reported that "YouTube was lead-
ing the charge in terms of attention to Proposition 8 in 
2009" and that "online outlets such as YouTube do in-
deed have the potential to set the agenda independ-
ently of, and even in advance of, more professional 
media outlets" [21].
Another recent study compared the topical differ-
ences between the New York Times and Twitter [28], 
and found that Twitter was a viable source of what 
were  considered  entity-oriented  topics  with  limited 
coverage  in  traditional  media.  Moreover,  that  study 
also found that "although Twitter users show relatively 
low interests in world news, they actively help spread 
news of important world events". Similarly, Kwak and 
colleagues [29] compared Twitter's trending topics to 
CNN headlines and Google trends. In their analysis, 
they identified that CNN was ahead in reporting more 
than  half  the  time,  compared  to  Twitter.  However, 
Kwak et al. [29] also found evidence of what can be 
considered  "focusing  events"  [30]  in  social  media 
agendas, noting that "some news broke out on Twitter 
before CNN and they are of live broadcasting nature 
(e.g., sports matches and accidents)" [29].
Altogether, there is fairly clear evidence from previ-
ous studies that the SNSs can be important interme-
dia  agenda-setting  agents,  particularly  because  of 
their capacity to quickly and easily share stories and 
break  news  as  it  occurs  [21,23,28,29].  Considering 
the intersection of these findings with that of previous 
work  on  focusing  events  [30]  and  live-event  news 
[31], it seems clear that agenda setting has reached a 
conceptual and empirical juncture [24]. Indeed, with a 
reinvigorated digital  mythology now surrounding the 
ability of SNSs to alter the mix and flow of ideas in 
media content, this study examines two core concepts 
that are crucial  for the future of agenda-setting re-
search: (1) the extent to which traditional media still 
lead (topically  and over time) the public agenda as 
represented in SNSs, and (2) intermedia agenda set-
ting within and across social media, particularly with 
attention  to  focusing  events,  sharing  media,  and 
creating original content.
On  the  first  of  these  points,  Sayre  and  his  col-
leagues wrote that "…the rise of new media has the 
potential  to  result  in  a  reverse  flow of  information. 
Particularly due to the speed with which many social 
media outlets such as YouTube and Twitter function, 
they  may  actually  have  the  ability  to  influence  the 
agenda of traditional news outlets" [21]. Though de-
veloping  for  decades,  this  potential  is  now  further 
augmented by mobile devices that have the ability to 
not only immediately capture but also share breaking 
stories through social media [32,33]. Since most so-
cial  media users  in many countries  can much more 
easily  access  and  share  information  through  social 
media outlets without much editorial or governmental 
oversight, when compared to traditional media, SNSs 
are now capable of not only breaking stories first but 
also building and setting traditional media agendas.
Yet  when considering the  different  uses  that  are 
made of social  networking sites, there is vastly less 
clarity on the extent to which certain social media lead 
(or  follow)  the  agendas  within other  online  social 
channels. While it is certainly not unusual for individu-
als to maintain active accounts on Twitter and Face-
book, as well as to visit YouTube, Wikipedia, or any 
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other  online  social  media,  the  ways  in  which  the 
residual content activity across different SNSs relates 
in terms of agendas has been understudied. Previous 
research typically focuses on only one social network 
site in relation to one traditional media outlet, and this 
practice  has  led  to  some  conclusions  where  social 
media  in  general  is  treated  as  monolithic  in  its 
agenda-setting capacity [34]. Attention has also often 
only  been  given  to  one  issue  across  agendas  over 
time  [11,21]  or  a  comparison  of  topics  over  both 
social and traditional media agendas [28,29].
The study reported here has begun to close some 
of these gaps by first considering the topical agendas 
of two leading traditional media outlets (the New York 
Times and CNN) as well as the most common shared 
stories  and  trending  topics  on  two  popular  SNSs 
(Facebook  and  Twitter).  Time-series  analyses  have 
then been applied to  the  most  prominent  topics  to 
track intermedia agenda setting across all outlets over 
time.  This  study is  thus  positioned to  determine to 
what extent traditional media sets the agenda for so-
cial media, as well as the limits of reciprocity for the 
public's media agenda through SNSs to enter into the 
traditional media agenda. In addition, this study be-
gins to compare intermedia agenda setting topically 
and across time within SNSs, and in so doing, adds a 
vital understanding of where traditional media, online 
uses, and content intersect around instances of focus-
ing events, particularly elections.
This  study  thus  examines  four  separate  media 
agendas over a period of six weeks that strategically 
includes the 2010 US Midterm Election as an estab-
lished focusing  event.  The influence  of  two distinct 
social media agendas and the underlying assumptions 
of media "produsage" [9] therein are thus examined 
against the flow of topics and investigation of subjects 
in traditional media. The following research questions 
were posed to examine reciprocity and the predictive 
capacity of SNSs in intermedia agenda setting.
3. Research Questions
RQ1: Which topics are made most salient in tradi-
tional media coverage, and which topics are made 
most salient on social networking sites?
RQ2a: Are there significant similarities between the 
topical agendas of traditional media channels and 
the agendas on social networking sites?
RQ2b: Are there significant similarities  within the 
topical agendas on social networking sites?
RQ3a:  On  the  most  salient  topics,  do  traditional 
media channels set the agendas for social network-
ing sites?
RQ3b: On the most salient topics,  do social  net-
working sites set the agendas for traditional media 
channels?
RQ3c: On the most salient topics, does one social 
network site set the agenda for another social net-
work site?
4. Method
The units of analysis in this study were headlines and 
trending items. The rationale for using these features 
to determine agendas is one that has been applied 
previously [5,28]. In addition, this analytical approach 
is also based on a rich background of work noting the 
critical  importance of  front matter,  and headlines in 
particular, in attracting audience attention and facilit-
ating  shorthand  interpretations  of  issues  [35,36]. 
Though the distinction can be somewhat controversial 
in a converged media environment, for the purposes 
of this study, "traditional" media were represented by 
the New York Times and CNN. "Social" media, other-
wise  hypothesized  as  social  networking  sites,  were 
represented here by two of the largest and most act-
ive, Facebook and Twitter.
The study thus began by collecting the top stories 
from the New York Times, CNN, Twitter, and Facebook 
for a period of six weeks in the fall of 2010 (11 October 
2010 to 24 November 2010) to examine the research 
questions posed. The 2010 US Midterm Election of 2 
November 2010 was specifically situated at the exact 
midpoint of this data collection period in order to ob-
serve  coverage  in  various  media  around  a  known 
focusing  event  [37].  At  randomly  selected  intervals 
(morning,  afternoon,  evening,  early  morning)  each 
day during this timeframe, the online editions of the 
NYT  [38]  and  CNN  [39]  were  simultaneously  cap-
tured, along with the most trended topics on Twitter 
and the most frequently shared stories on Facebook.
Trending  topics  from Twitter  were  gathered  from 
http://whatthetrend.com [40] and filtered to only in-
clude the leading ten trending topic in the USA per day. 
Though unofficial, whatthetrend.com is self-defined as 
"the front page of the real-time web" and was particu-
larly useful to categorize trends because for each trend, 
a brief audience-generated synopsis explains why it is 
trending. Most-shared stories on Facebook were pulled 
from  http://itstrending.com [41]  and  limited  to  the 
eight most frequently shared headlines reported there 
[42]. In order to form more even comparisons with the 
news organizations NYT and CNN, items were filtered 
by the "News" categorization there. Though not offi-
cially endorsed by Facebook, itstrending.com operated 
by collecting all of the content shared via the Facebook 
Open Graph API and ranked each story, with complete 
headlines and original media outlet, solely by the num-
ber of times it was shared.
As  with  previous  intermedia  agenda-setting  re-
search [5], this study focused on what amounted to 
the "front pages" of the NYT and CNN online, which 
were subject to regular updating and had a clear hier-
archy of most important items. These agendas were 
coded  and  then  compared  with  more  conceptual 
agendas of Twitter and Facebook that were determ-
ined by public activity in discussing or sharing certain 
topics within those spaces. Coding was completed by 
an individual trained in the categorical definitions with 
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previous  experience  in  content  analysis.  Preliminary 
coding was used to develop operational definitions for 
each category, minimize disagreements,  and expand 
the codebook to include a "media" category. Following 
these  negotiations,  the  coder  independently  made 
coding decisions for all of the headlines and trending 
topics in the sample.
The headlines and topics from each media outlet 
were categorized into one of 17 possible categories in 
an  adapted  codebook  used  previously  in  separate 
publications  by  Natarajan  and  Xiaoming  [26]  and 
Groshek [5]. The categories in these codebooks were: 
(1) Accidents/natural disasters, (2) Agriculture, (3) Busi-
ness/economics, (4) Crime/criminal justice/law and order, 
(5) Ecology/environment, (6) Education, (7) Health care, 
(8) Military/national defense, (9) Politics, (10) Race/reli-
gion/culture, (11) Social problems/services, (12) Sports, 
(13) Technology, (14) War/terrorism, (15) Oddities, and 
(16) Undecided.
As already noted, this  study added a (17) Media 
category. This decision was the result of preliminary 
coding that quickly revealed a regular amount of cov-
erage about developments in media (i.e.,  Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube, and other social media) or coverage 
of  other  topics  in  media,  such  as  video  games  or 
forms of  citizen  journalism.  Since  this  coverage did 
not  fit  neatly  into  existing categories—the "Techno-
logy" category, for example, was more about innova-
tions such as new devices rather than media covering 
other media or media uses—the codebook was expan-
ded on these grounds.
The reliability of the primary coder was determined 
by a second individual,  otherwise uninvolved in the 
study, who coded a randomly selected 17.7% of the 
sample. Following some practice coding and a training 
session,  intercoder  reliability  was  0.78  when  calcu-
lated using Cohen's Kappa. Though coding was thus 
not free from error, and trending items on Twitter re-
quired additional training for both coders, this level of 
reliability  with  a  measure  that  accounts  for  chance 
agreement was well above the minimum level of 0.70 
indicated by Frey, Botan, and Kreps [43].
Once coded, the media agendas of these four outlets 
were determined by level  of topic (category) salience 
and then rank-ordered, time-lagged, and compared to 
one another. Two key statistical techniques were applied 
to answer the research questions posed here. The first is 
a  fairly  common  correlational  measure  of  agreement 
among ordinal rankings, Spearman's rho, which is based 
on frequency of topical categories across media outlets. 
This ranking was derived simply by the number of times 
a headline topic was coded for each media outlet.  For 
example, culture was the most common topic of head-
line coverage on CNN by raw frequency, with 103 in-
stances (22.9%) and for each media outlet, categories 
were  ranked  by  frequency  of  appearance  and  then 
those rankings were compared across outlets for correl-
ational  association  with  Spearman's  rho,  which  is  a 
routine appropriate for such ordinal-level measures.
The  second—Granger  causality  testing—is  a  time-
series  analytical  technique that  has been growing in 
prominence  in  communication  research,  particularly 
with attention to agenda setting [11,21,44,45]. Though 
now  discussed  fairly  regularly  in  literature,  Granger 
causality calculates a significance test for measuring if 
the time lags of one variable (in this case, topic sali-
ence in a media outlet) relate to the distribution of an-
other variable (here,  topic salience in another media 
outlet) over time. Put somewhat briefly, Granger caus-
ality  in  intermedia  agenda  setting  occurs  when  the 
distribution of topic salience in one media outlet explain 
a significant amount of variance of topic salience distri-
bution in another media outlet, above the variance that 
can explained by endogenous topic salience time lags 
[46]. Compared to other time-ordered techniques, such 
as time-lagged correlations, and VAR or ARIMA model-
ing, Granger causality testing has been argued to be 
more accurate and provide clearer evidence of time-
order relationships [11,47]. In other words, this tech-
nique can statistically determine when topic salience in 
one media agenda  precedes and  predictively explains 
topic salience in another media agenda.
In order for Granger causality testing to be effective, 
however, several conditions must be considered. Data 
streams must have a minimum of 40 unique observa-
tions [48]; the six weeks of daily data coded for this 
study suitably  has 45 instances.  Variables  must  also 
achieve stationarity [49] to safeguard statistical valid-
ity; here, augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were conduc-
ted for each variable considered. All variables for each 
media outlet were uniformly transformed with a natural 
logarithm  and  all  achieved  stationarity.  Finally,  in 
Granger causality tests, an appropriate time lag must 
be selected. Though there is no conventional standard 
for determining time lags, most research relies on stat-
istical criteria [50] derived for this purpose. This study 
utilized a minimum lag of one unit, which is required 
for  Granger causality  testing,  and otherwise applied 
the most-identified suggested lag length across all lag 
criteria.
Of course, though Granger causality tests identify 
statistically  significant  time-ordered  relationships 
between dyadic  media  agendas,  they  do  not  prove 
real-world  causation  [51,21].  Together  with  topical 
measures of media agendas, though, these analyses 
are very well suited to precisely examine reciprocity in 
intermedia agenda setting, specifically considering the 
predictive role of unique social networking sites.
5. Findings
1710  items  were  gathered  over  the  six-week  time 
frame identified here. Each headline and trending item 
was coded into only one of the categories from the 
codebook. For practical purposes, the lowest five cat-
egories  accounted  for  no  more  than  1.6% of  total 
units analyzed. These categories (Military, Social Prob-
lems,  Education,  Undecided,  and  Agriculture)  were 
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thus grouped together into a generic "Other" category 
that was not  explicitly  considered in terms of  rank-
ordering.
The first research question examined which topics 
are made most salient in traditional media coverage 
and which topics are made most salient on social net-
working  sites.  Table  1  summarizes  the  results  ob-
served here, where for CNN, NYT, and Facebook, the 
four  most  salient  topics  by  category  were:  Culture, 
Politics, Crime, and Business. Though there was some 
variation across these media in terms of ranking the 
prominence of news items—bearing in mind that only 
the  most  shared  news  items  on  Facebook  were 
tracked—a relatively high degree of similarity in topic-
al  agendas can be observed here between not only 
two traditional news agencies but also one social net-
work site, Facebook.
Twitter,  the other social  network site considered in 
this  study,  demonstrated a much different  agenda of 
most salient items. Specifically, the four most frequently 
identified categories on Twitter were (in order): Cul-
ture,  Oddities,  Sports,  and  Media.  Thus,  the  topics 
made most  salient  varied across  traditional  to  social 
media, at least with respect to the most talked-about 
trending  topics  on  Twitter.  Table  1  summarizes  the 
rank-order of all topics by media outlet and the topical 
discrepancies there, most notably with regard to Twit-
ter from all other outlets, can be readily observed.
Along  these  lines,  RQ2a  examined  if  there  were 
significant similarities between the topical agendas of 
traditional media channels and the agendas on social 
networking  sites.  Here,  it  can  be  observed that  the 
topical  agendas  of  CNN  and  Facebook  are  highly 
correlated (p = 0.85, p < 0.01). When also measured 
with  Spearman's  rho,  the  New  York  Times'  topical 
agenda is moderately correlated to that of the most 
frequently shared news stories on Facebook (p = 0.64, 
p < 0.05). Based on the findings shown in Table 1, it is 
somewhat unsurprising to observe that the agenda of 
most  popular  trending  topics  on  Twitter  were  not 
correlated with the agendas of either traditional media 
outlet. There was also no statistically significant rela-
tionship  between  the  topical  agendas  of  Facebook 
news shares and Twitter trending topics.
Thus, when considering RQ2a, there were differen-
tial relationships between traditional media and the two 
SNSs examined here. There was a fairly strong correla-
tion  between the topical  agendas  of  both  traditional 
media outlets and that of Facebook, but no relationship 
between any traditional  media agenda modeled here 
and  trending  topics  on  Twitter.  Likewise,  analysis  of 
RQ2b found no significant similarities within the topical 
agendas on the social networking sites Facebook and 
Twitter.  In  other  words,  the  topical  agenda of  most 
trending items on Twitter were unrelated to any other 
media  outlet  over  the  time  period  analyzed  here. 
Though not explicitly posed as a research question, it is 
worth reporting a moderately strong relationship (p = 
0.68, p < 0.05) between the topical  agendas of the 
NYT and CNN. These results are summarized in Table 2.
Table 1. Issue salience by topical category in coverage on CNN, New York Times, Twitter and Facebook.
Category CNN 
Rank
CNN 
%
NYT 
Rank
NYT
%
Twitter 
Rank
Twitter 
%
FB 
Rank
FB
%
Culture 1 22.90 4 7.10 1 41.30 2 15.60
Politics 2 17.30 1 28.70 5 4.90 1 22.80
Crime 3 9.30 3 7.30 9 1.10 4 7.80
Business 4 7.10 2 20.20 8 1.60 3 9.70
Accidents 5 6.90 6 5.10 7 2.70 8 3.90
Media 6 5.80 9 3.10 4 5.30 5 7.20
Health care 7 5.60 8 4.00 11 0.70 6 6.70
Oddities 8 4.00 12 1.10 2 18.70 7 6.40
Technology 8 4.00 11 1.30 6 3.60 12 1.10
Terrorism 10 3.60 5 6.90 9 1.10 10 3.60
Sports 11 3.30 7 4.40 3 14.40 10 3.60
Environment 11 3.30 10 2.40 11 0.70 8 3.90
Others 13 6.90 13 8.20 13 4.00 13 7.80
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Note: The four most frequent categories' rank order by media outlet appear in italics.
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Table 2. Bivariate Spearman's rho correlation mat-
rix for issue salience by topical category in cover-
age on CNN, New York Times, Twitter and Facebook.
CNN NYT Twitter Facebook
CNN --  
NYT 0.68*  --
Twitter 0.24    -0.07  --
Facebook 0.85** 0.64* 0.18 --
*p < 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01
After  considering  the  topical  agendas  of  these 
traditional and social media outlets, this inquiry then 
proceeded to examine intermedia agenda setting of 
the most salient topics across different media outlets 
over time. To begin, RQ3a considered whether tradi-
tional media channels set the agendas for social net-
working sites on the most salient topics. The categories 
"Politics" and "Culture" were analyzed further as these 
were, on average, the two most prominent categories 
across all four media.
When looking at the distribution of political coverage 
over time, it can be observed that the frequency of polit-
ical  coverage on the New York Times Granger-caused 
political coverage (χ2 = 4.35, p = 0.02) on Twitter trend-
ing topics over time. In addition, the political coverage 
on CNN was shown to have Granger-caused (also with 
lags of two days) political coverage on Twitter, but only 
at p < 0.10 (χ2 = 2.57, p = 0.09). In terms of political 
coverage, there were no significant Granger-causal rela-
tionships between traditional media and Facebook over 
time. Though not explicitly entered as a research ques-
tion, it is worth reporting that political coverage on the 
NYT Granger-caused  (χ2= 3.65,  p  = 0.036)  the  fre-
quency of CNN's political coverage over time.
In examining coverage of culture, the frequency of 
such coverage on CNN was shown to have Granger-
caused (with a lag of one day) cultural stories shared 
on Facebook (χ2 = 5.78, p < 0.05). Likewise, the New 
York Times' cultural coverage frequency also Granger-
caused  this  category  of  coverage  (χ2  = 3.55,  p  = 
0.07) on Facebook but only at the p < 0.10 threshold. 
There were no instances where the amount of cultural 
coverage in traditional media coverage was shown to 
have  Granger-caused  cultural  trending  items  on 
Twitter,  even  though  such  coverage  was  the  most 
regular type of coverage on Twitter by far.
Altogether, it can thus be observed that there are 
still  fairly  clear  intermedia agenda-setting effects  of 
traditional media on social networking sites, but that 
influence  is  not  uniform across  topics  or  the  social 
media channels of  Facebook and Twitter.  Somewhat 
surprisingly,  although  uncorrelated  topically  across 
agendas,  politics  on Twitter  was  Granger-caused by 
both NYT and CNN political  coverage as distributed 
over time. On the other hand, though Facebook was 
significantly  correlated  topically  to  traditional  media 
agendas,  its  political  coverage  was  not  Granger-
caused by either traditional network over time. How-
ever,  cultural  coverage  on  Facebook  was  actually 
Granger-caused by the frequency of such coverage in 
both the Times and on CNN. 
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, there are clear differ-
ences in the distributions of political and cultural cov-
erage over time and across media. Political coverage 
centers on a focusing event—the election of 2 Novem-
ber 2010—that appears to have shaped the frequency 
of coverage overall, but particularly on Twitter where 
almost no political coverage was observed before this 
date. Cultural coverage, on the other hand, followed a 
seemingly more regular cycle of coverage, such that 
the intermedia agenda-setting influence of traditional 
media could be observed only on Facebook.
The next  research question (RQ3b) was posed to 
determine the extent to which social networking sites 
set the agendas for traditional media channels on the 
most salient topics. The two most dominant categories 
of coverage, politics and culture, were again modeled 
but  in  this  case  to  measure  potential  reciprocity  in 
intermedia agenda setting. Here, when looking at polit-
ical  coverage,  Twitter  (with  a  one-day  lag)  nearly 
Granger-caused politics coverage (χ2 = 2.32, p = 0.11) 
on CNN, but only at a very generous level of statistical 
significance. There were no other predictive relation-
ships regarding political coverage originating from SNSs 
to traditional media that approached statistical signific-
ance. Once more, though Facebook was more topically 
related to the agendas of both the New York Times and 
CNN, when analyzing the frequency of political stories 
shared on Facebook over time, there were no Granger-
causal relationships that predicted political coverage in 
the NYT or on CNN.
When considering cultural coverage and the ability of 
social networking sites to set the agenda of traditional 
media over time, the frequency of cultural trending top-
ics on Twitter did Granger-cause (χ2 = 6.11, p < 0.05) 
cultural coverage on CNN. No statistically significant rela-
tionships could be observed with the New York Times' 
coverage of cultural topics. The distribution of cultural 
news topics on Facebook was again unrelated, in the 
Granger-causal sense, to either traditional media outlet.
The intermedia agenda-setting effect of social net-
working sites during this period and across these media 
thus appears much more limited than that of traditional 
media [52], even as large numbers of users around the 
world create and share content through SNSs. In this 
study at least, there was only clear evidence that social 
media influenced the agenda of traditional media in the 
case  of  cultural  trending  topics  on  Twitter  having 
Granger-caused cultural coverage on CNN. While Twit-
ter also neared significance in Granger-causing political 
coverage on CNN, the distribution of cultural and polit-
ical coverage in the New York Times was untouched by 
the amount of such coverage over time on the social 
networking  sites  studied  here.  The  most  frequently 
shared stories about these topics on Facebook had no 
predictive causal-type relationships whatsoever.
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Figure 1. Political coverage over time across traditional media and social networking sites. Note: 2 
November was the date of the 2010 US Midterm Elections.
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Figure 2. Cultural coverage over time across traditional media and social networking sites. Note: 2 
November was the date of the 2010 US Midterm Elections.
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Further, when examining the last research question, 
there were no statistically significant Granger-causal re-
lationships observed for political and cultural coverage 
within the social  media analyzed in this study. RQ3c 
queried whether, on the most salient topics, one social 
networking site sets the agenda for another social net-
working site? Based on analyses performed here, the 
answer to that question is no—and there are by and 
large no topical or time-ordered relationships that can 
be  observed within  the  agendas  and the  intermedia 
agenda-setting functions of social networks sites in this 
sample. The findings of all Granger causality testing are 
summarized in Table 3.
Table  3. Significant  intermedia  Granger-causal 
relationships in political and cultural coverage dis-
tributions across media.
Granger
Relationship
Political 
Coverage
Cultural 
Coverage
CNN  Twitter→ 2.57# --
CNN  Facebook→ -- 5.78*
NYT  Twitter→ 4.35* --
NYT  Facebook→ -- 3.55#
CNN  NYT→ -- --
NYT  CNN→ 3.65* --
Twitter  CNN→ 2.32+ 6.11*
Twitter → NYT -- --
Facebook  CNN→ -- --
Facebook  NYT→ -- --
Twitter  Facebook→ -- --
Facebook  Twitter→ -- --
*p < 0.05, #p < 0.10, +p < 0.15
6. Conclusions
During the  timeframe and with  the media analyzed 
here, it is evident that the public agenda—as manifest 
in trends and shares on social networking sites—has 
not yet come to drastically alter agendas of traditional 
media in a regularly predictive manner. While the dis-
tance from editors and journalists as gatekeepers of 
news and information flows to the public has clearly 
diminished  with  the  popularization  of  social  media 
[53,54],  it  seems the  potential  for  SNSs  to  directly 
shape media agendas does exist but only sporadically 
and on certain topics. Considering that different online 
media platforms, from blogs to various forms of social 
media—in this case Facebook and Twitter—allow for 
certain affordances and restrictions, it is reasonable to 
find that each platform demonstrated differential  in-
termedia agenda setting potential as leveraged by the 
sociotechnical nature of its architecture.
The  outward  goals  of  this  study  were  to  more 
broadly  examine  intermedia  agenda  setting  across 
topics and over time to examine if, and to what ex-
tent,  different  social  networking  sites  could  lead, 
rather than follow, the agendas of traditional media. 
To  answer  simply,  yes,  it  is  possible  that  a  social 
networking  site  (Twitter)  can  predictively  explain 
cultural coverage in a traditional media outlet (CNN), 
but  apart  from that  finding,  there  is  little  concrete 
evidence of social media upending the shape and flow 
of news agendas. Indeed, as summarized in Table 3, 
there remains palpable evidence of traditional media 
setting the agenda in terms of both what was shared 
(Facebook) and what was created (Twitter) in social 
media  spaces,  though the  level  of  measurement at 
the  headline  and  categorical  level  does  introduce 
limitations  upon  the  analysis  and  its  application  to 
agenda setting at a finer gradation.
Still, while these findings are somewhat at odds with 
other research [11,21,28,29], these other studies each 
often considered just one form of social media (com-
monly Twitter or YouTube) or focused on just one par-
ticular topic over time. The study reported here expands 
the scope of study and makes a useful contribution by 
identifying both topics that generate the most attention 
and become most salient in social networking sites, as 
well as making comparisons of intermedia agenda set-
ting between multiple traditional media outlets and with-
in social media. Results observed here indicate that not 
all social media are created equal with regard to both 
agendas and influence—but also that events, particularly 
the ones that can be predicted, like elections, are espe-
cially pertinent in shaping social media agendas.
In particular, findings from this study suggest that 
topically,  Facebook  is  relatively  strongly  related  to 
both CNN and the NYT in terms of topic salience. Com-
paratively, trending topics on Twitter are not signific-
antly related to the topical agendas of either traditional 
media or another social media outlet. Yet, when set in 
a predictive capacity on specific topics, trending topics 
on Twitter can actually precede and help explain tradi-
tional  media  (CNN)  coverage  of  culture—and  nearly 
show the  same  relationship  (where  p  =  0.11)  with 
political coverage (again on CNN). The distribution of 
most frequently shared political and cultural stories on 
Facebook,  however,  did  not  show  any  predictive 
Granger-causal relationships over time, despite  being 
far more closely related to the topical agendas of both 
traditional media outlets examined here.
Thus, while there is a tendency in both popular and 
academic literature toward grouping social networking 
sites  as  somewhat  similar  entities  in  terms of  their 
transformative  effect  [55,56],  it  is  worth  noting the 
activities  and uses that take shape in these spaces 
can be much different [22]. These unique uses can, of 
course,  lead  to  unanticipated  outcomes  [13,14,51], 
particularly with regard to agenda setting. While there 
is good reason to note the growing import and influ-
ence of  user-generated culture across  media indus-
tries, caution should also be exercised to delimit forms 
of  social  media uses, often structured by the social 
networking sites themselves to make better sense in 
tracking the influence each does or can have in larger 
online or offline settings [57].
On the other hand, traditional media more consist-
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ently set the agendas in time-ordered Granger-causal 
capacity for both Twitter and Facebook. Somewhat in-
terestingly,  these  relationships  were  also  bound  to 
certain  social  networking  sites  by  topics.  Political 
trending  topics  were  Granger-caused  by  traditional 
media  on  Twitter  and  shared  cultural  stories  were 
Granger-caused  by  traditional  media  on  Facebook. 
Parsing out exactly which casual mechanism explains 
these findings of why one and not the other is difficult 
and not readily apparent by looking at content alone. 
Other scholars, such as  Huberman, Romero, and Wu 
[58] have identified proximity and anonymity as im-
portant features that discriminate uses of online me-
dia, and Kwak, Lee, Park and Moon [29] found that 
less  reciprocity  between  users  functionally  situates 
Twitter as closer to mass media in that relatively few 
senders produce most of the news for an audience of 
followers.
Altogether, while the precise rationale for why polit-
ics on Twitter and culture on Facebook were Granger-
caused by traditional  media is  not readily apparent, 
these results  nonetheless clearly  suggest  that inter-
media agenda setting needs to be considered in more 
circumspect  terms—directionally,  topically,  and  with 
respect  to  precisely  identified media outlets.  As the 
results of this study further indicate, it is certainly im-
portant  to  consider  social  media  in  intermedia 
agenda-setting processes because certain social net-
working sites have the potential to shape elite agen-
das, and in this study cultural coverage on Twitter was 
shown to  Granger-cause  cultural  coverage  on  CNN. 
We  generally  characterize  this  outcome  as  agenda 
trending and it suggests that social media trends can, 
indeed, set traditional media agendas. Yet while the 
findings noted here suggest that agenda trending is 
taking place, it seems only at cetain moments where 
the impact of social media can key in to focus on an 
event [59].
While it is speculative as to why cultural coverage 
on  CNN was  predicted  by  cultural  coverage  Twitter 
and cultural coverage on the NY Times was not, one 
potential explanation may be the regular integration 
of Twitter in particular on normal CNN broadcast cov-
erage, which is a feature certainly less shared by the 
NYT.  Notably,  the  content  patterns  observed  in  the 
agendas of social media were shown here to have been 
informed by those very same elite agendas, or likewise 
to extend the agendas of traditional media further.
In this study, the 2010 US Midterm Elections was 
situated within data collection as an expected, fixed 
focusing  event.  Under  this  circumstance,  traditional 
media was shown to have primarily led social media 
coverage  of  politics,  with  the  exception  of  Twitter 
trends  showing a very  limited  (p  < 0.15)  Granger-
causal relationship to political coverage on CNN. On 
balance, the importance of focusing events—whether 
previously identifiable or emergent, as in the case of 
cultural coverage on Twitter—seems to be a key fea-
ture  of  intermedia  agenda  setting  that  has  been 
somewhat  overlooked in  previous  literature  [60,61]. 
As shown here, patterns of agenda reinforcement with 
relatively limited reciprocity and innovation can still be 
observed  in  the  contemporary  user-producer  media 
environment.
While some scholars [10] have suggested the end of 
agenda setting may be in sight, this study offers some 
empirical evidence of the adaptability and amplification 
of  traditional  media  agendas  through  the  public  in 
social  media  trends.  In  addition,  findings  presented 
here signal the reciprocal capacity of social media in 
intermedia  agenda  setting,  specifically  in  instances 
where  topical  similarities  are  limited.  These  findings 
also identify a pressing need for further specificity in 
not  only  clarifying  intermedia  agenda-setting  flows 
through  certain  social  media,  but  also  additional 
attention to focusing events and their topics that may 
well  facilitate  more  evenly  reciprocal  agenda-setting 
processes,  such  as  those  described  by  Meraz  [11]. 
Although  the  results  reported  here  do  not  precisely 
align  with  previous  work  on  blogs,  they  do  not 
necessarily conflict, and rather work to extend and add 
nuance to the conceptualization of SNSs as the next 
iteration of online media that may well contribute to a 
shaping of  traditional  media agendas as the field of 
gatekeepers  continues  to  widen  by  producers  and 
deepen by influence.
Practically  speaking,  the  differential  levels  of 
agenda-setting influence observed here suggest Twitter 
is  more  likely  to  follow,  rather  than  lead,  political 
agendas  formed  by  traditional  media  and  cultural 
coverage on Facebook is more clearly set by agendas 
on traditional media. Conversely, cultural coverage on 
Twitter  was  the  one  category  of  coverage  where  a 
social media channel set the agenda for a traditional 
one, in  this  case CNN. On a theoretical  level,  these 
findings  open  up  a  space  where  agendas  must  be 
considered not only topically—where there may be little 
apparent  relationship—but  also  temporally,  where 
within-topic flows may suggest greater agenda-setting 
reciprocity over time and across channels. Considered 
jointly, the outcomes of this study consequently identify 
that  the  nature,  structure,  uses,  and  content  of 
Facebook and Twitter are unique but still  compatible 
and  possibly  complementary  in  the  public  arena, 
particularly as each is differently shaped and potentially 
shaping traditional media agendas.
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